November is, of course, a matter of intense interest in both church and government circles internationally.
The Canadian bishops issued on November 25, 1981, a sharply critical assessment of the American government's decision (announced on August 9, 1981) to proceed with the production and deployment of the neutron bomb.
2 Seeing in this decision a return to the dangers of the cold war, the bishops warned that use of such a weapon risks inaugurating a general nuclear war, which has been condemned by the Council and in various papal statements.
3 More fundamentally, they drew attention to the moral perversity which appears to guide research and development of weapons whose principal merit supposedly is their capacity to spare the material objects on a battlefield while exterminating the persons caught there. More recently, press reports record a statement by the Canadian bishops to the Parliamentary Committee for External Affairs, made in late February 1982, which advocated the dismantling of nuclear weapons installations in Canada, the discontinuation of Canadian manufacture of component parts of nuclear weapons, and, most dramatically, re-examination of Canada's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
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without, however, promising to make another statement in the foreseea ble future. 6 In none of these statements does the Conference go beyond the teaching of the Second Vatican Council: "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation" (Gaudium et spes, no. 80) ? In their first statement on the question (December 1971) the bishops, after recalling the outlines of the just-war theory, echo the Council in recalling the limits established by the tradition in selecting targets and strategies.
8 Again, at their annual assembly in October 1978, the Conference called on the government to take initiatives which would encourage international negotiations for the control and eventual elimi nation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, notably chemical weapons. 9 This episcopal position was taken up again in their message "The Easter People," issued in response to the important National Pastoral Congress at Liverpool, which had brought together 2,000 delegates from dioceses and organizations in May 1980. At that Congress the group discussing peace questions had tentatively challenged the validity of the just-war tradition and, by a majority, condemned as unjust all nuclear wars and even the continued possession of nuclear weapons. In response to this strong position, the hierarchy expressed their own continuing concern about these questions.
Subsequently, in response to insistent requests to issue a more com prehensive and detailed analysis on the topic, perhaps in the wake of Cardinal Krol's articulation of the American hierarchy's position, the Conference issued, on November 27, 1980, a statement which, after repeating the teaching of Gaudium et spes and recalling its own earlier statements, confesses its inability to say anything more definitive. It is often supposed that the Church can provide an immediate answer to every moral question, however complex. This is not the case. Sometimes the passage of time and much prayerful consideration are required before the mind of the Church can be clarified and a pronouncement made.
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The bishops then go on to pose various questions that evidently reveal the skeleton of their own internal debate and suggest the crucial questions on which the bishops themselves have been unable to find agreement:
Is it ever permitted to use a weapon of mass destruction? Or to threaten or intend to use it? Or to possess it as a means of keeping the peace? In particular, is it right to urge unilateral disarmament, seeing it as a stage towards multilateral disarmament? And is it right for our own country to abandon the nuclear deterrent while allowing nuclear weapons from other countries to be based in our territory?
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This last question is capital in the evaluation of European episcopal teaching on nuclear deterrence, which involves an even greater complexity of moral argument than the problem challenging their American counterparts. For European churches must answer two separate moral questions: (1) Is it legitimate to possess, and threaten to use, their own independent nuclear arsenal? Even apart from that anguishing question, (2) is it legitimate to accept the security that comes from the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, to which Great Britain has given governmental and public support and co-operation? Refusing to treat the two questions in unrealistic isolation from each other, the bishops defer a definitive answer.
Several months earlier, however, on July 18, 1980, the Conference had indicated a certain ambiguous reserve about the recent government decision to modernize its nuclear forces by adopting the more advanced Trident 1 missile system for its submarines. It did not, however, condemn the decision to modernize.
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The voice of Basil Cardinal Hume of Westminster has been raised on these topics in considerable detail. While hesitating to declare himself opposed to all uses whatsoever of nuclear weapons, he has articulated a position whose component articles might easily persuade individual Catholics to embrace a "nuclear pacifist" stance. Locating his own moral argument within the traditional respect for the right to life, the Cardinal presupposes the immorality of targeting civilians with nuclear weapons 
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With persuasive allusion to the creative power of the Word and of our own words to heal the wounds of human nature, the Archbishop urges a return to the wellspring of Christian life in order to animate a renewal of Western approaches to peace. I am convinced that nuclear warfare makes it virtually impossible to draw distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. It may be possible to have a just war but there can be no such thing as just mutual obliteration. I recognise that. And the old distinctions about the just war I find unconvincing in this climate. We are capable of unbinding the forces which lie at the heart of creation and of destroying the entire planet.
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Nevertheless, Runcie counsels against unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, which might shatter the Atlantic alliance. Rather, he calls for removal of all battlefield nuclear weapons and urges the adoption by NATO nations of a "no first use of nuclear weapons" policy. He then shrewdly cautions against expecting that the financial savings to be derived from dismantling the battlefield nuclear weapons can be transferred to more humanitarian purposes, such as aid to poorer nations. For he foresees that the alliance's imperative efforts to shore up its conventional forces in Europe, in order to establish a military balance on that level, will absorb whatever savings can be made from discontinuing the maintenance of battlefield nuclear weapons. We are convinced, however, that if it is immoral to use these weapons it is also immoral to threaten their use. Secondly, the statement includes an element unique in episcopal statements from North America or Europe: a rejection of the present willingness of citizens (including church officials) to leave to governments the right to make these crucial decisions (about a possible nuclear response to conventional or nuclear attack) without any possibility of public influence at some point in the life of the nation. Protesting the present governmental policy of silence on these questions, the bishops reject the demand that such options be delegated to governmental officials.
We do know that the policy [of our government] is one of deterrence, but we do not know what measure of retaliation is contemplated should deterrence appear to fail. While it may not be politic for government to disclose certain information, we should know whether a threat of retaliation with such weapons is likely to be implemented in the event of any attack or only in the case of a nuclear one. Whatever is done will be done in our name and, in a democracy, with our presumed agreement. 
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Another postconciliar development in the Church's response to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consequent heightening of the risk of total war, which could not have been predicted during the Council itself, is the recent silence, almost unbroken, of the hierarchy of France on this question. As is well known, most of the leaders in the Council's effort to take a strong stand against the momentum towards nuclear destruction were French. In his study of the sessions leading up to Gaudium et spes, W. J. Schuijt narrates the vigorous interventions in favor of a complete condemnation of nuclear deterrence and its supporting arsenal made by numerous French bishops, notably Feltin (Paris), who presciently feared the uncontrollability of such weapons, Ancel (Lyons), Gouyon (Rennes), and Martin (Rouen), all of whom urged condemnation of the national right to make war, Liénart (Lille), who disputed the claim that modern war might be "just," and Bouillon (Verdun), who advocated complete disarmament. 21 These powerful efforts to bring the Church to a radical stance on modern war were, of course, parried by other fathers, especially some of the Americans, including a small band led by Archbishop Philip Hannan (New Orleans), who felt that all the early versions of Schema 13 were wanting in balanced appreciation of the moral responsibilities and dedication of statesmen and military officials. Surely one of the remarkable ironies of recent church history is the almost complete reversal of position by these two national hierarchies; for it is now the American bishops who have taken the lead in damning the arms race, while the French have so far contented themselves with very muted criticism indeed of the possible moral perils of deterrence.
Indicative of this trend to speak of the nuclear peril in cautious tones is the recent (June 1982) statement made jointly by the French and German hierarchies. After a year's deliberation on the topic, disclaiming any episcopal responsibility for elaborating political platforms, and recalling the crucial but somewhat remote criterion of the common good as the measure of politics and strategy, the collaborative effort resembles for all the world the famed progeny of the hills. of war. 25 If such a trend were to continue and to expand, a brighter light might fall in France on the risks and the consequent moral responsibilities of authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. In such circumstances it would not be unlikely that conscience would quicken in France, evoking an appropriate response among the hierarchy.
A more likely development in church teaching touching these questions in France, however, would be the ecclesial re-examination of the more fundamental question of the citizens' responsibility to participate in governmental processes and to form personal judgments on national options in foreign policy. As early as 1974, Msgr. Gabriel Marie Joseph Matagrin (Grenoble) pointed out that in recent years, under the Fifth Republic, there had been a growing tendency in the public to delegate to the occupant of the Elysée the right, and the corresponding duty, to make fundamental choices vitally affecting even the physical security of the nation-for example, in the field of nuclear deterrence. 26 It was precisely to counteract this exaggerated deference to public authorities on vital questions that Matagrin summoned the Church. The call is still echoing in the Church and may be heard more acutely in a social context changing under various pressures suggested above. At any rate, for the time being, the irony remains intact. While the American bishops are now talking in the accents of the French fathers of the Vatican Council, the eldest daughter of the Church keeps her peace. hegemony, achieved by harnassing the resources of Western Europe in its cause. Of capital importance in carrying out this design is the subtle and divisive campaign to split Europe off from its natural ally, the United States, especially by means of a "peace offensive" shifting the blame for the present division of Europe onto the shoulders of the United States.
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It is reported that this tone was used in earlier versions of the text to make an explicit defense of the deployment of the neutron bomb, although revision of the text deleted this conclusion.
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Response to this global strategy must be based on a clear assessment of the danger, a clear view of the goal of liberal democracy, namely, the establishment of order through law, and a firm commitment to nuclear deterrence, including the unambiguous willingness to execute the deterrent threat. Needless to say, in the present crisis arms-control negotiations are a high moral imperative, according to the document's final and scarcely saving phrases.
Of the three extant documents on which one must rely in attempting to gauge as circumspectly as possible the tenor of the letter promised for later this year, presumably the most significant is the lengthy address by Cardinal Höffher, president of the German Episcopal Conference, assembled on September 21, 1981, at Fulda. For the address, which was given after the members of the Episcopal Conference had had an opportunity to propose modifications of the text, represents more than merely a personal statement by the Cardinal. Recapitulating the traditional teaching on the limits of legitimate self-defense, Hofíher reminds his audience and readers that the tradition disallows acts of reprisal and equally unambiguously condemns indiscriminate bombing which may violate the immunity of noncombatants. While defending the right to maintain even a nuclear arsenal as a form of deterrence, he recalls that Paul VI and John Paul II have expressed anxiety about the indefinite durability of the present period of tense mutual deterrence, precariously balanced on an armaments scale that mocks the moral pretensions of contemporary man.
32 Turning briefly to the discussion of the wisdom of deploying the neutron bomb, the Cardinal seems to question that decision on moral grounds by recalling that the choice to cross the nuclear threshold by utilizing such a weapon would involve those responsible for the decision in the indefensible act of inaugurating a nuclear war, since it is not certain 30 "The Soviet Union wishes... to create the impression that it is the ties with the United States that constitute the real threat to peace" (7). with such programs of modernization, the Cardinal raised the alarm against unreflective acquiescence in the drift towards a nuclear whirlpool.
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Speaking another time on his own initiative, Willebrands seems to have gone further, pointing to the possibility of self-deception in using the word "war" to refer to a nuclear confrontation which would surely bear no resemblance to any phenomenon yet seen on the earth. 36 In this spirit of scepticism about the reliability of much of the governmental and public discussion of war and peace issues, the Cardinal announced the extensive church consultations which were then being undertaken in the hope of enlightening the public forum with the light of reflection from within the Church.
One of the voices certain to influence this process of consultation when it reaches the level of the episcopacy itself is that of Msgr. R. P. Bär, Auxiliary Bishop of Rotterdam, whose article "Christianity and Deterrence" was published in the English version of the NATO magazine. 37 In this article Bär reveals his own position, which discounts any possibility of a binding statement of a political nature on nuclear deterrence being issued by the Dutch hierarchy. His reasoning is simple and perhaps faintly preconciliar: Roma tacente, taceant omnes episcopi. Since Catholic teaching must be universal in order to be binding, national hierarchies must await the initiative of the Vatican, which has so far eschewed any unambiguous condemnation of those possible uses (or threatened uses) of nuclear weapons not condemned by Vatican II. Of manifestly fundamental importance to the development of such divergence of views between the Continental hierarchies and those of the English-speaking world is the geographical factor. Proximity to the poised forces of the Warsaw Pact can have a marvelously clearing effect on political analysis. While the Channel would not constitute a very considerable firebreak in a nuclear war, it may well be that it continues to serve psychologically as an assurance of invulnerability, at least in a conventional conflict. Another significant factor is the comparative flexibility of maneuver available to the government planners in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, since all of these powers boast a relatively balanced blend of conventional and nuclear forces. France and Germany, on the other hand, to speak only of the great Continental powers, find themselves in a less advantageous position. For, while they are great powers indeed militarily, the forces at their disposal are less adaptable to undertaking radical revisions of strategy. France, on the one hand, may now find itself overcommitted to reliance on nuclear weapons in an era when the alliance may be moving in the direction of greater emphasis on conventional deterrence and defense. Germany, on the other hand, has denied itself the nuclear option, thus finding itself at the mercy of shifts in defense policy taken by other governments, notably that of the United States. The Continental powers, then, are less able to contemplate radical changes in European security arrangements and understandably are less open to church initiatives urging such fundamental reconsiderations of policy.
These two observations, of a relatively uncontroversial character, would probably be easily admitted by most students of the spectrum of ecclesiastical views on deterrence. An additional reflection, however, more speculative in nature, may shed some further light on the developing opposition between these two groups of church leaders. That reflection concerns the differing value given to deference to political authority in the two groups of societies, the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European. There is, or at least has been in recent decades, a much less confrontational style in the political culture of the Continent than in the English-speaking nations of the Atlantic community, who display a certain connatural affinity for designing and exercising a political system of checks and balances. This divergence between political cultures which treasure deference to political authority, such as those of France and Germany, and those built on a preference for creative conflict within the political realm may be crucially operative in the dynamics of episcopal deliberations as they approach the possibility of voicing fundamental opposition to governmental policy on issues of vital national interest.
Collegiality, in a word, is at work. Some probably will prefer to call it cacophony, the emergence of an irreconcilable opposition between groups of national hierarchies whose collégial deliberations about matters of public responsibility are so influenced by national or cultural perceptions that any harmonious orchestration of the Church's universal teaching authority has been rendered impossible. Many will sigh nostalgically for the serenity of an earlier era: Roma locuta, causa finita. Their worst misgivings about the Council are being corroborated by the unmistakable disarray of the magisterium.
Indeed, the present survey does present a case study in collegiality: a moment in the life of the Church which reveals both the risks and the promise of the postconciliar Church. The risk is evident in the present, perhaps inevitable, proliferation of ecclesial responses to what is supereminently mankind's common threat: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strategies. Some will be brooding on the story of Babel.
Others, however, may read in the same record rather the promise of a universal magisterium more supple and responsive to the accelerating urgency of moral challenges. For in the variegated pronouncements of the various ecclesial voices there stand revealed as well the virtuosities of collegiality, the heightened capacity of the Church to respond to emerging crises through the witness of those churches most acutely and urgently confronted with the responsibility of leadership on a particular moral issue. From this more optimistic perspective it is not accidental that the American Church has taken a conspicuous lead in condemning the present strategic policy of the nation. The urgency to pass judgment on the doctrine of assured destruction weighs more heavily on the American Church than on any other. For it is Americans alone who have already used atomic weapons in war. It is likewise America which admittedly makes the most definitive nuclear threats and sees to it that such threats remain credible. In this sense the morality of nuclear deterrence is preeminently, though by no means exclusively, an American problem. Once, in the spirit of Vatican II, national episcopal conferences became more fully conscious of their respective local responsibilities, it was seemingly inevitable that American bishops would take the lead in uttering this long overdue condemnation. Collegiality thus contributes to the consciousness of the Church universal the peculiar moral acuity of one nation's memory of having already perpetrated the unspeakable crime against God and man which the Council so resoundingly condemned. In doing so, it may provide other national episcopal conferences with the crucial witness of the repentance of one people who have learned through experience to eschew reliance on the weapon with which they first burdened the human condition. There is no moral witness so unimpeachable as memory.
Yet, other churches besides the American have a right to a voice in the universal response of the Church to the nuclear peril. Especially those churches gathering the faithful of nations almost helplessly sheltered for the last third of a century under the American nuclear shield have a right to voice their own moral anxieties and national concerns. For example, the hope of Europeans that the American strategic arsenal itself be not dismantled before these alliance partners are able to design alternative defense measures is a legitimate concern which the church leaders of these nations are obliged to articulate in the context of the current dialogue. "A decent respect for the opinions of mankind" is a sentiment becoming America's bishops, then, as surely as it befitted the founding fathers at the moment of our nation's birth. Sensitivity to the tension of other, especially closely associated, episcopal bodies as the American bishops make their own fateful choice in November seems to be an ecclesial obligation flowing from the Catholic character of the magisterium. On the delicate and decisive point of distinguishing between the use and threat of nuclear weapons on the one hand, which the NCCB position has already condemned, and the continued possession of the strategic arsenal itself on the other, which the Conference defended as an 446 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES interim policy pending reciprocal arms-control measures, attention to the caution that marks virtually all European episcopal statements on deterrence would be the mark of an episcopal body conscious of its integration in the universal magisterium as well as of its unique burden as the episcopacy of the only superpower open to religious inspiration and influence. For collegiality transcends unilateralism in the development of church teaching. Collegiality finally is Catholic.
